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 Recent decades have seen renewed attention to issues of causal inference in the social sciences, 
yet implications for life course research have not been spelled out nor is it clear what types of 
approaches are best suited for theoretical development on life course processes. We begin by 
evaluating a number of meta-theoretical perspectives, including critical realism, data mining 
and experimentation, and find them limited in their potential for causal claims in a life course 
context. From this, we initiate a discussion of the logic and practice of ‘natural experiments’ 
for life course research, highlighting issues of how to identify natural experiments, how to use 
cohort information and variation in the order and timing of life course transitions to isolate 
variation in exposure, how such events that alter social structures are the key to identification 
in causal processes of the life course and, finally, of analytic strategies for the extraction of 
causal conclusions from conventional statistical estimates. Through discussion of both positive 
and negative examples, we outline the key methodological issues in play and provide a road 
map of best practices. While we acknowledge that causal claims are not necessary for social 
explanation, our goal is to explain how causal inference can benefit life course scholarship 
and outline a set of practices that can complement conventional approaches in the pursuit of 
causal explanation in life course research.
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At first blush, one might think that studies using a life course perspective would have 
particular affinity with questions of causal processes and, by extension, causal inference. 
Questions of temporality, stability and change, trajectories and transitions, and the 
foundational idea of lives unfolding in unique socio-historical contexts are all central 
features of a life course perspective and all have parallels in discussions of causality and 
causal inference (see, for example, Elder et al, 2003; Morgan and Winship, 2015). 
At the same time, it is not clear how concerned life course research is about making 
credible causal claims or about adopting research strategies that allow for better causal 
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inference given well-recognised and unchallenged threats to causal claims. As there 
are clearly a number of advantages to research that can credibly make causal claims, 
life course researchers may be missing important opportunities for extending their 
scope of research.
Life course researchers may, however, have particular advantages with respect to 
causal inference. In particular, longitudinal research designs where the same people 
are followed over time may be better at measuring outcomes given the greater use of 
prospectively recorded information and better suited to ordering data in time. Hence, 
such data can satisfy basic dicta that causes precede effects in time. Such data also 
allow researchers to identify changes in personal experiences that can be associated 
with changes in personal outcomes. Here, people can serve as their own controls and 
researchers can also mitigate potential biases associated with the universe of time-stable 
attributes of individuals (Halaby, 2004). Yet, longitudinal data may still fall victim to 
issues of selection and endogeneity that introduce bias into metric coefficients and 
hence undermine causal inference (Heckman, 1981; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The 
key issue is systematic differences between the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups, those 
stratified by some explanatory variable, which will bias estimates of the variable on 
some outcome. So while life course research may have conceptual frameworks and 
data that facilitate causal inference, typical analytic strategies fall short.
With this background, this paper has three objectives. First, we articulate three 
different approaches to causality and discuss their relevance for life course research. 
Second, we discuss the potential contributions of ‘natural’ experiments for causal 
inference with specific attention to how they are identified, how longitudinal data can 
be organised to exploit their value, and how statistical approaches, including difference-
in-difference estimation, regression discontinuity and instrumental variables estimation, 
facilitate causal inference. Finally, we provide some synthesising discussions and make 
a case for combining the rich archives of longitudinal data with exogenous changes 
in social structure to produce better ideas of cause and effect in life course processes.
Conceptualising causality: juggling nihilism, pragmatism and 
dogmatism
Three broad perspectives on causality adopt different normative and operational 
approaches to causality and causal inference. The first, critical realism, asserts that 
much of reality exists and operates independently of our awareness or knowledge of it 
(Danermark et al, 2005). Empirical social science, in contrast, is based on the ability to 
observe variables and processes directly and to employ a variety of discursive strategies 
for articulating cause and effect. The problem articulated by Bhaskar (2013) and others 
(Archer et al, 2013) is that coincidence between an independent and dependent 
variable may tell us very little about the mechanisms of causal influence. The problems 
are myriad, but mechanisms can go inactivated (because of the necessity of a third 
(fourth, fifth and so on) factor as in the case of a statistical interaction), mechanisms 
can be activated but not be perceived (due to the finite nature of observation), or be 
activated but be negated by some countervailing force. In the end, critical realism 
argues that limits of observation and measurement means that the counterfactual 
necessary to prove causal effects can never be fully established.
Works at the opposite end of the spectrum, those focused solely on the organisation of 
data have also cast some doubt on the value of causal identification. Andrew Abbott, for 
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example, has argued that current conceptions of causality fall far short of their theoretical 
objectives (Abbott, 1988; 1998). An alternative strategy (see Abbott and Hrycak, 1990) 
is to focus more attention on identifying salient and informative patterns in data. Such 
a strategy has more than a few variants, but appears in the life course literature most 
prominently in form of latent class analysis (Macmillan and Copher, 2005) and sequence 
analysis (Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2010; Elzinga and Liefbroer, 2007). The key logic of 
both approaches is to forgo distinguishing causes and effects and instead to model how 
variables fall into identifiable configurations that tell theoretical stories.
While philosophers and data miners have retreated from efforts to identify causes, 
many, if not most, economists have doubled down. Although traditional economics 
was diverse in its acceptable/preferred empirical methods, recent years have seen 
the rise of random control trials (RCTs) as its go-to methodology (Deaton, 2009). 
The key problematic is that any consequential variable that is not included in the 
model introduces a correlation between the error term and the measured explanatory 
factors and hence biases coefficients that link the explanatory factors to the outcome 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). With RCTs, the process of randomisation ensures that 
the only observed or unobserved difference between groups is exposure to whatever 
treatment (cause) is under study.
While life course scholars interested in questions of causality clearly have options, 
there seem to be limits in all of the above strategies. In the case of critical realism, 
the force of argument is really critique and the proposed solutions do not seem to 
lead anywhere productive. Data mining clearly has value, but efforts to incorporate 
such work in life course research have left many scholars wanting (see discussions 
in Levine, 2000; Wu, 2000). A key concern is that sequences and clusters may not 
contribute much to efforts to explain social phenomena. Moreover, variables included 
in clusters, classes and sequences may in fact have causal relations among them that 
are simply ignored for empirical convenience. So, data mining neither supplants 
concerns about causal relationships nor provides a fully palatable alternative.
Although frequently described as the ‘gold standard’ for social research, RCTs may 
actually be the worst of the options for life course research. There are four problems. 
The first is that much and perhaps most of what life course researchers care about is 
not amenable to experimental manipulation. We cannot randomly assign people to 
families or relationships and randomly assigning people to other social institutions like 
work and school or to communities is frighteningly expensive and administratively 
prohibitive. A second problem is that experiments live or die based on their external 
validity, yet RCTs almost never have a random sample and instead focus on in situ 
populations where unseen and often long-standing selection dynamics are unknown 
and perhaps unknowable (Sampson, 2008). Third and related, treatment effects are 
not homogenous (that is, uniform across the underlying population) and instead are 
magnified or minimised depending on the non-random attributes of the underlying 
sample (Heckman, 2001; Manski, 1999; Smith, 2003). This of course moves the 
ball back into the court of observational studies, with all their problems of causal 
inference. Finally, life course scholars care about social structure. Yet, the idea of the 
classic experiment is that social structure is removed (Sampson, 2008). Exposure to a 
treatment occurs in a social void. Bursztyn and colleagues (2017), for example, conduct 
a lab-based RCT where the treatment of interest is a world where supervisors and 
managers in organisations do not know the gender of the person communicating with 
them. How realistic is this? Or more worrisome, what does it mean to produce a set 
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of findings that occur in a social structure that simply doesn’t exist in the real world? 
These are real world problems that are not solved by naïve advocacy for a method 
based in its ability to deal with one, and only one, problem of causal inference. In the 
end, three distinct but influential approaches to questions of causality do not seem 
to provide much leverage for causally inclined life course researchers.
On the potential of natural experiments for life course research
An alternative with perhaps more promise is the use of ‘natural’ experiments. In what 
follows, we describe what natural experiments are and how researchers might go about 
finding them; illustrate how cohort comparison – a frequent feature of life course data 
– provides unique opportunities for causal claims; emphasise how attention to the 
trajectories and transitions provides unique leverage for causal inference; and discuss 
analytic strategies that, when coupled with the above, provide statistical estimates 
from which one can more credibly make causal claims.
Identifying natural experiments
The central premise of a natural experiment is the identification of a situation 
or circumstance that mimics the core dimensions of an RCT. With a true RCT, 
researchers randomly allocate individuals to a treatment and control group and then 
manipulate some condition to expose the treatment group to something that the 
control group does not experience. In theory, the two groups are identical on both 
observable and unobservable characteristics (pretreatment equality) and differ only on 
whatever the treatment is or does. In simplest terms, the end result is that any existing 
differences between the two groups are due to the treatment and only the treatment.
Natural experiments arise when comparable individuals or groups are sorted into 
treatment and control groups by something that is typically beyond their control. 
They differ from RCTs in that the exposure and allocation is not controlled by the 
researcher but instead occurs naturally. ‘Naturally’, in this context, indicates a large 
variety of processes that occur at a number of levels. For example, one could think 
of the comparison of life expectancy in North and South Korea as an example of the 
effects of political systems on health. To do so requires that one agrees that: (1) North 
and South Koreans were similar to one another at the point of political differentiation; 
(2) North and South Koreans did not choose their political systems; and (3) that there 
is not social, economic and cultural mixing that would contaminate the treatment.
The latter assumption is probably easiest given the strict border controls, censorship 
of media and hypersegregation of the two populations. The first assumption might 
be more challenging but has at least has some degree of historical credibility. The 
most challenging is the middle assumption given the historical legacy of the Korean 
conflict and its origins in ideological differences around multiple dimensions of social 
organisation. Still, the example lays out the logic and provides the terms of evaluation.
In general, natural experiments incorporate some aspect of historical change, 
variation in social structure, or socio-economic or socio-political anomaly into the 
research framework. In doing so, they often focus on some quasi-random event in 
the world as a vehicle for telling causally credibly stories of social experience and 
human development. This yields a first principle in the use of natural experiments 
for life course research:
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(1) A key assumption is that the groups under study are for comparable and for all intents 
and purposes identical (or conditionally identical once controlling for sorting variables) and 
that one group is randomly affected by a treatment that is outside their control.
Although we cannot claim comprehensive coverage and in fact are always amazed 
at the creativity that goes into the use of natural experiments, we identify four types 
of natural experiments. A first is randomisation in public administration. Here, 
governments often use randomisation to either ensure equity in the provision or 
expectations of services. In Finkelstein and colleagues (2012) for example, a natural 
experiment occurred when the state of Oregon opened a waiting list for Medicaid and 
then provided insurance to a random subset of applicants. In a similar vein, Angrist 
(1990) took advantage of the fact that the US government ran televised draft lotteries 
during the Vietnam War based on day of birth to study the effects of military service 
on labour market outcomes. Although we delve into the study in more detail later, 
a more recent example of this approach is Gangl and Ziefle’s ( 2015) study of the 
impact of changes in family leave and benefits policies on women’s commitment to 
work and family.
Second, natural experiments are often exactly that: variation in exposure because 
of variation in nature. Kirk (2009), for example, uses the devastation wrought by 
Hurricane Katrina on the city of New Orleans, USA, and the parishes surrounding 
it to study the impact of residential relocation on likelihood of recidivism among 
people recently released from penal institutions. The key feature of the research is 
the fact that those released in the year prior to the hurricane could choose to move 
back to their original neighbourhood or to move to some other neighbourhood 
while those released post-hurricane really could not move back to their original 
neighbourhood as the neighbourhoods had been destroyed.
Third, social dislocations often produce remarkable and dramatic changes in life 
circumstances. As one example, Card (1990) studied the impact of a massive increase 
in low-wage labour on local economies by exploiting the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. 
In spring 1980, the Castro government opened the port at Mariel to anyone who 
wished to leave, with the consequence that more than 125,000 Cubans arrived in 
the Miami area over a period of a few months. For Card, the key issues for causal 
inference lie in (1) the unplanned and unexpected nature of the influx, (2) the 
stark increase in the size of the Miami labour force, approximately 7%, and (3) 
the fact that such increases were not seen in other surrounding cities. Through 
comparison with these cities, Card could speak to the question of whether wages 
and employment rates are suppressed by the influx of low-wage, immigrant labour 
(and they are not).
Finally, heterogeneity in the availability of ICT and other technology often 
produces large differences in the availability of information with important social 
consequences. Kearney and Levine (2015), for example, studied the effect of 
the television show Sesame Street on children’s test scores. At the time, federal 
licensing laws dictated that the very popular show was randomly accessible 
depending on availability of either VHF (very high frequency) or UHF (ultra 
high frequency). Capitalising on this variation, the researchers were able to 
compare academic outcomes across places with different levels of reception 
(and found that those in areas of greater exposure were less likely to get left 
behind in school).
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Exploiting variation by cohort and transitions
If the first dimension of natural experiments is identifying some exposure of 
significance, the second dimension involves identification of appropriate comparison 
groups. Akin to arguments for RCTs, the key assumption or realisation is that the 
exposure of interest is differentially distributed across groups that are, for all intents 
and purposes, identical. Here, a life course perspective provides guidance. One of 
the central principles of life course research is the idea that lives unfold in distinct 
historical contexts (Elder et al, 2003).
Methodologically, researchers activate this principle by drawing on concepts like 
generation and cohort to differentiate the timing of people’s experiences to changing 
historical conditions (see, for example, Shanahan et al, 1997). Here, different cohorts 
have distinct experiences because they ‘encounter’ history at unique points in their 
lives and this gives them unique experiences. Thus one can simply stratify some group 
by year of birth, identify the key experience of interest and model some outcome 
in relation to the intersection of the two.
Elder’s (2018) classic work on children of the Great Depression exemplifies this 
approach and provides a useful template for research on a host of topics. Importantly, 
the empirical underpinnings of this approach provide a route for research with the 
potential for much stronger claims for causal inference.
The key starting point is cohort differences in life experience. There is no 
question that cohort differences exist and can be hugely consequential. At the 
same time, the social structures around cohorts are often remarkably stable. Most 
of the major institutions in society and the rules and resources that characterise 
them do not change easily or quickly (Sewell, 1992). As a consequence, cohorts 
that are adjacent to one another typically inhabit worlds that are very similar. 
From the standpoint of empirical research, one can argue that adjacent cohorts 
are, for all intents and purposes, identical to one another. Obviously, this is always 
an empirical question.
But life course scholarship is organised on the principle that social differentiation 
occurs due to difference in exposures. If no differences exist or occur, cohort 
differentiation should not exist. This leads us to a second principle for using natural 
experiments for causal inference:
(2a) Cohort comparison can help identify causal effects if one can credibly claim or show 
that such cohorts are/were indistinguishable prior to or in the absence of exposure to a 
cause of interest.
If cohorts present one potential avenue of comparison, exploitation of life course 
dynamics presents another. Life course scholarship places particularly weight on the 
unfolding of human lives and how the life course can be conceptualised as patterned 
transitions through social institutions (Shanahan, 2000). Traditionally, this involves 
transition into and out of formal schooling; movement into paid employment; 
entry into intimate partnerships, be they marriages or cohabitation; parenthood; 
and transitions out of one’s childhood home. The value of this in the use of natural 
experiments is that it yields interesting and often multiple comparison groups for 
both ‘controls’ and the ‘treated’. Returning to Kirk (2009), the key issue of interest 
is knowing whether high rates of recidivism reflect continuity of community and 
social networks after one is released from prison. The problem is disentangling 
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selection into neighbourhoods from neighbourhood effects in and of themselves. To 
do this, Kirk focuses on people who had been convicted of crimes and incarcerated 
while residing in the metropolitan area around New Orleans. The key life course 
dynamic that allows him to create treatment and control groups is the timing of 
release and whether it occurred before or after Hurricane Katrina levelled large 
swathes of New Orleans and the surrounding area. He uses timing to construct two 
‘control’ groups that were released prior to the hurricane and one ‘treatment’ group 
released post-hurricane. The logic of the analysis is that the post-hurricane group 
will have had their relocation choices highly restricted, would be significantly less 
likely to return to their original community in New Orleans, and hence will have 
access to pre-incarceration criminal associates restricted or constrained.
Another example that capitalises on variation in life course dynamics to specify 
treatment and control groups is a recent study by Gangl and Ziefle (2015). Here, 
the question of interest is whether changes in parental leave entitlements in 
Germany altered the balance of psychological commitments to work and family. 
In 1992, the duration of benefits was extended from 18 months to 36 months 
with benefit entitlements extended to the 24th, month and this stayed in place 
with minimal change through 2007. Using the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP), the researchers were able to identify changes over time associated 
with exposure to different policy environments, specifically prior to (1989–1991) 
or after (1992–2000 and 2001 and beyond) the policy change. What facilitates 
causal claims is identification of multiple ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups. On 
the treatment side, mother’s exposure to the policy is shaped by whether they 
were employed or not at the time the policy was enacted. Mothers who were 
employed were entitled to both the parental leave and a flat rate benefit; mothers 
who were not employed were only entitled to the benefit (that is, there was no 
job to take a leave from). On the control side, one comparison group is young 
women without children, while a second is older women with completed fertility. 
The key assumption is not that the groups are substitutable in work–family 
orientations (as there is no reason to assume this) but that their trends over time 
would be similar were it not for variation in the policy environment (see section 
on ‘Difference-in-difference estimation’, later). In general, such work highlights 
a complementary principle:
(2b) The order and timing of key life course transitions generates important and multiple 
treatment and control groups that can facilitate both assessment of the robustness of results 
and potentially illuminate mechanisms linking cause and effect.
What is a cause? Social structural opportunities and measurement
The identification of ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups requires a clear understanding 
of the ‘exposure’ of interest. Yet, here we think that much of the literature has 
been overly cavalier and yields a number of cautionary tales. Although there are 
numerous examples, we focus on a highly influential study of education and health: 
Lleras-Muney (2005). Her set-up was extremely elegant. She identified discrete years 
in which laws were passed in certain US states that mandated longer participation. 
She then used this to identify ‘treatment’ groups where options for leaving school 
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were legally constrained and ‘control’ groups where they were not. With this 
set-up, Lleras-Muney could extract two very valuable pieces of information. First, 
do cohorts indeed have different educational attainment depending on whether they 
were exposed to the participation laws? Second, do cohorts have different mortality 
based on whether they were exposed to the participation laws? If the answer to these 
questions is yes, the two differences can be calibrated to quantify just how much 
mortality decreases given changes in educational attainment. In Lleras-Muney’s 
research design, she focused attention on synthetic cohorts who were 14 years old 
between 1914 and 1939. Tracking these cohorts over time, one can calculate death 
rates during specific intervals in the future, for example between 1960 and 1970 and 
between 1970 and 1980 and then examine whether death rates correlate with both 
exposure to compulsory attendance laws or law induced-educational attainment. With 
this set-up, Lleras-Muney reports large, statistically significant effects and interprets 
the coefficients as causal effects of education on mortality risk.
To us, Lleras-Muney is a cautionary tale about the need to think deeply about 
what constitutes a cause. Any experiment, natural or other, lives or dies based on 
the quality of the treatment. In this case, the treatment is exposure to compulsory 
attendance laws and its knock on for average educational attainment. So it is useful to 
look at the laws to see what exactly they are doing. In examining each law in Lleras-
Muney’s (2005) appendix B, one learns some interesting things. First, there are a 
not-trivial number of cases where compulsory attendance was relaxed and these cases 
are not used. Second, many laws were relatively short lived. California, for example, 
switched back and forth between six and seven mandated years of schooling five times 
between 1921 and 1936.2 Maybe this is not a problem, but there certainly appears 
to be SUTVA (stable unit treatment value assumption) issue given that people in the 
very same school and even in the very same family are likely treated quite differently 
under the ever-changing laws. Third, and perhaps most striking, little education 
was actually mandated. The overwhelming majority of laws mandated seven years 
of mandatory schooling with almost all of the laws tightly clustered between six and 
eight. The mandated change is also quite small. In the vast majority of cases, the laws 
increased compulsory attendance by one or two years. In other words, these laws were 
mandating either completion of primary school or some secondary school attendance 
(with secondary schools becoming core parts of the education system between 1910 
and 1930). If one believed nothing more than the human capital model of education 
(Becker, 1994) or its application to a ‘health production function’ (Grossman, 1999), 
perhaps an additional year of education at the end of primary / beginning of secondary 
school would matter. But for most social scientists, this seems like a particularly trivial 
part of the attainment distribution and the overall conclusion that each additional year 
of compulsory education increases educational attainment by 4.8% is not particularly 
compelling.
The problem is one of social structure. Educational attainment may be adequately 
measured as years of formal education but the meaning of educational attainment requires 
attention to the operation of educational and other institutions, institutions which are 
themselves embedded in unique social and historical contexts. Not being experts on 
US educational policy and practice in the early 20th century, we simply do not know 
what changes in cognition, behaviour and social circumstance accrues from adding one 
year of education that results in six to seven years of total schooling. There are obviously 
dozens of potential connections between greater education and health in general (see, 
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for example, Ross and Wu, 1995), but it is unclear whether any of them would be 
activated by this amount of change in educational attainment. Given this, it may not 
be surprising to learn that a broad, multinational assessment of 18 cases of compulsory 
schooling reform for 12 European countries between 1903 and 1976 found next to no 
support for a causal effect of any magnitude (Gathmann et al, 2015). Out of a possible 
98 effects, only 14 for males and only 5 for females were statistically significant. If one 
were to correct for multiple assessments using a Bonferroni adjustment, it is not clear 
that any would be statistically significant. Such cautionary tales indicate a third principle 
in the use of natural experiments for life course research:
(3) Causes and resulting ‘treatments’ should be conceptualised at the level of social structures 
and specifically capture social dynamics that meaningfully alter the conditions of everyday 
life in ways that are theoretically salient for some given outcome.
Although it may seem like a trite principle, it is useful to note that the dominant 
trend in the use of natural experiments is to focus on some change in policy that is 
largely decontextualised, assumed to have homogeneous meaning and effects, and 
is often transported from one study to another given its proven ability of satisfying 
the core requirements of instrumental variables. The use of compulsory education 
laws to identify causal effects of educational attainment for example has been used 
to study a host of health measures and risk behaviours (see review in Eide and 
Showalter, 2011), wages, earnings and wealth (Devereux and Hart, 2010; Oreopoulos, 
2006), marital stability (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011), fertility (Black et al, 2008; 
Cygan-Rehm and Maeder, 2013), criminal offending and incarceration (Bell et al, 
2016), political interest, involvement and voting (Milligan et al, 2004), life satisfaction 
and happiness (Oreopoulos, 2007), religious affiliation, church attendance and 
frequency of praying (Hungerman, 2014), and belief in superstition and horoscopes 
(Mocan and Pogorelova, 2017). It is also worth noting that the only areas where 
there have been sustained attempts to replicate are the areas of wages and health 
and at best the weight of the evidence is quite mixed on both counts. To us, this is 
expected given that education was quite heterogeneous in structure and process at 
the time of most reforms (although this rapidly changed in the 1980s and 1990s with 
the consequence that educational systems are remarkably similar in the contemporary 
period (Meyer et al, 2017)) and that the consequences of education continue to be 
loosely coupled with coarse measures of attainment.
Drawing inference
While the identification of a ‘natural experiment’ opens the door for causal estimation, 
problems still exist in that treatment and controls remain dynamic in the face of a 
natural experiment. Here, we discuss three strategies for drawing causal inference with 
natural experiments. These include difference-in-difference approaches, regression 
discontinuity and instrumental variable analysis.
Difference-in-difference estimation
Difference-in-difference (hereafter D-I-D) estimation is arguably the simplest strategy, 
but is also the one most vulnerable to threats to causal inference. The logic of D-I-D 
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is that one tracks changes over time in an outcome as a way of identifying a causal 
effect. The key identifying assumption is that the exposure introduced through the 
natural experiment occurs in one population and not another. Given this, a causal 
estimate is identified through change occurring in a treatment population relative to 
change occurring in the control group. For causal inference, the two populations 
must have pretreatment equality and there are a number of strategies for assessing 
this. Pretreatment equality does not imply that the two groups are identical on the 
outcome. Indeed, groups can be widely disparate on the outcome, but they need to 
have parallel trends prior to the treatment. Figure 1 provides a graphic description 
of this with y-axis measuring the value of the outcome of interest, Y, and the x-axis 
capturing time.
Here, the treatment and control groups have different levels prior to the treatment 
but parallel trends over time. The magnitude of this difference is stable over time. With 
longitudinal data and more than one data point, one can formally assess this either 
by looking at differences at successive points in time and assessing degree of change 
or, alternatively, by adopting a regression approach and seeing whether a coefficient 
capturing change over time varies across groups. In the post-treatment period, the 
key assumption is that the treatment group has a counterfactual that is the expected 
value on the outcome were there no change in trend among the treatment group. 
There is no way to validate this assumption, but its strength is directly proportional to 
the strength of the parallel trend assumption and by extension pretreatment equality.
Determination of the treatment effect is simply the difference between the 
counterfactual value and observed value. Depending on the type of data one has, 
there are two complementary strategies for deriving a causal estimate. One is simple 
algebra. One can calculate the difference in outcome value before and after for the 
treatment and the control groups and then subtract the differences from one another. 
There is an analogue using standard regression techniques. Formally,
y = 0 + 1T + 2S + 3 (T ∗ S) + 
Figure 1: Simple difference-in-difference set-up
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where y is the outcome, T is a dummy variable indexing period (pre-exposure = 0, 
post-exposure = 1), S is a dummy variable indexing group (not exposed = 0, exposed 
= 1), and T*S is a composite capturing the unique value on the outcome for the 
exposed group in the post-exposure period. With a regression approach, one can 
include further covariates that might confound the relationship between exposure 
and outcome or one can elaborate the model by differentiating within the two groups 
to further sharpen the group of interest (for example, a ‘triple difference’ model). 
Again, Gangl and Ziefle (2015) are useful in that their analyses explicitly differentiate 
work–family orientation for women with and without completed fertility before and 
after changes in family leave and benefit policy in Germany.
As a final comment, there is a technical literature on statistical issues around D-I-D 
approaches but most of this focuses on issues of efficiency rather than bias. For us, the 
critical issue is the parallel trend assumption. With either strong argumentation or 
strong evidence, one can reasonably assume that the difference between the exposed 
and non-exposed groups in the pre-exposure period would have remained unchanged 
were it not for the exposure. In the absence of such argument or evidence, D-I-D 
estimates have reasonable credibility as causal effects.
Regression discontinuity
A second approach for improving causal inference is regression discontinuity 
(hereafter RD). With regression discontinuity, there exists some threshold that crisply 
separates groups into an exposed group and a non-exposed group. In the classic 
work of Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), the focus of attention was the impact 
of scholarships on school performance. The central problem is that scholarships are 
awarded based on merit and those who received them are high performers prior 
to the award and should be high performers after the award. The solution was to 
focus only on students on either side of the award line. In other words, if students 
were awarded a scholarship if their grade point averages (GPA) exceeded 80%, then 
attention would focus solely on those with GPAs between 79% and 81% with the 
assumption that such groups would be very similar to one another and comparison 
of school performance for those with and without scholarships within these groups 
would yield the causal effect of scholarship awards. In life course research, there are 
frequently age cut-offs for a variety of dynamics and researchers could exploit such 
cut-offs for causal inference. Similarly, adjacent cohorts can be seen as functionally 
similar to one another while simultaneously subject to different exposures.
RD relies on three principles. First, the research subjects must not be able to 
manipulate their status through recognition of the threshold. For example, a student 
who is able to convince a teacher to award them a higher score that moves them 
across the threshold may differ in some observable way from those who cannot. This 
would introduce selection bias into the process.
Second, there needs to be some degree of random error in the threshold metric. 
If grading was perfect and involved no error, there would be systematic differences 
between those that have GPAs of 79% and those that have GPAs of 81%. But if one 
assumes some degree of random error in grading, as is generally accepted, then one 
can assume that the 79%ers and the 81%ers are really the same population and hence 
the scholarship is independent of pre-existing traits.
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Third, there presumably is some ‘bandwidth’ where cases within the ‘band’ are 
sufficiently similar to one another and where cases outside the band are sufficiently 
different. Returning to the GPA example, it may be perfectly acceptable to assume 
that those within the 79% to 81% band are substitutable for one another, yet highly 
problematic to assume something similar for those between 70% and 90%. In practice, 
establishing an appropriated bandwidth is crucial and there is important work that 
provides guidance (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). Given the importance of these 
assumptions, RD diagnostics typically focus on examining cases on either side of the 
threshold as to their similarity or difference.3
Figure 2 shows examples of RD analyses using the rdrobust, rdbwselect and rdplot 
in Stata 15.1. The example is adapted from Calonico et al, (2014). Here, the 
running variable is a standardised measure of parental income, the threshold is 
the income cut-off for eligibility of financial support, and the outcome is the 
likelihood of dropping out of college. Panel A is the association between two 
random variables with a uniform distribution. The key aspect of the graphic 
is the lack of a gap at the threshold (0) and the apparent similarity of values, 
average values and variances on either side of the threshold. This results in a 
non-significant coefficient of −2.54 (z = .46) for the bandwidth of −37.59 to +37.59 
on the parental income measure. For an original sample, the analysis uses 250 cases 
below the threshold and 226 cases above the threshold. Panel B shows the case where 
there is a strong discontinuity at the threshold. This is the more realistic example 
where there is a strong gradient to parental income and the likelihood of attaining a 
college degree. Yet from the perspective of RD, most of this information is irrelevant 
to the estimation of the causal effect due to unobserved heterogeneity bias. Instead, 
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attention focuses on the cases on either side of the threshold. In this case, there is 
a clear gap with cases immediately below the threshold having significantly lower 
average values than cases immediately above the threshold. Again, we can formally 
estimate this difference by establishing an appropriate bandwidth, restricting analyses 
to cases within the band, and calculating the difference in average values for cases 
on either side of the threshold. In this case, the resulting coefficient has a statistically 
significant value of −7.46 (z = 5.08) for cases within the bandwidth of −17.7 to 
17.7. Of the 1,297 cases in the original sample, the RD analysis is restricted to 359 
cases below the threshold and 322 cases above the threshold.
RD designs are not common in life course research. One recent example, however, 
is a paper on the impact of politics and religion on fertility by Aksoy and Billari 
(2018). The natural experiment in play is the electoral success of the pro-family, pro-
natalist AK Parti in the 2004 Turkish election. In this research, the discontinuity is 
defined in terms of narrow margins of victory in district elections that is calculated 
as the size of the vote share for the AK Parti in relation to the next largest party. The 
logic of the argument is that close elections can be tipped either way by idiosyncratic 
occurrences (such as bad weather) and hence elections that are particularly close 
are substantively similar on either side of the threshold. Drawing on the work of 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), they adopt a bandwidth of .15 (.075 margin of 
victory/loss) and conclude that exposure to AK Parti governance increases fertility 
between 2006 and 2010 by 7.75 children per 1,000 women between the ages of 15 
and 49, an increase that is robust to the inclusion of several possible confounders and is 
specified due to social welfare provisions that targeted young families, mothers and the 
poor. Other RD examples within a life course tradition include Ludwig and Miller’s 
(2007) study of the impact of Head Start, a multifaceted education-based enrichment 
programme on life course outcomes in the US and Bernardi’s (2014) study of 
compensatory advantages in grade promotion among primary school children in France.
Instrumental variable analysis
A third approach is a variant on the broad use of instrumental variables (hereafter IVs) 
for causal identification (Bollen, 2012). Consider, for example, prisoners released in 
Kirk’s (2009) analyses. For those released prior to Hurricane Katrina, three quarters 
returned to their original parish and one quarter took up residence in a different 
parish. If the ‘treatment’ is residence in a different neighbourhood, then fully one 
quarter selected into the treatment. Even in the post-Katrina period, allocation was 
not crisp. Here, 50% returned to the same parish and 50% went to a different parish. 
The latter is actually quite remarkable given the level of devastation produced by 
the hurricane.
Given issues of selection and non-compliance, it can be useful to treat a natural 
experiment as an IV for the treatment of interest. With an IV, estimation involves 
two stages. In the first, a variable that is unrelated to the outcome of interest is used 
as a predictor (instrument) of the treatment of interest. In the case of Kirk (2009), 
the period of release pre- or post-Katrina predicts whether people returned to their 
original parish or not. In the second stage, the outcome of interest is regressed on 
the predicted treatment measure. This, under ideal circumstances, removes the 
correlation between the explanatory variable and unobserved characteristics. In 
doing so, estimation only uses the portion of the variability in the treatment effect 
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that is uncorrelated with omitted variables. The key challenge, one that characterises 
all IV estimation, is the need to satisfy the ‘exclusion’ assumption, the assumption 
that the instrument and the outcome are unrelated to one another (see discussion in 
Angrist and Pischke, 2014). It is also important to recognise that IV estimation limits 
generalisability. As Angrist and Krueger (2001: 77) note, IVs provide an estimate 
for a specific group – namely, people whose behaviour can be manipulated by the 
instrument. In econometric terms, the latter is described as the local average treatment 
effect or LATE.
The obvious challenge with such approaches is satisfying the necessary assumptions. 
We see three dimensions to this. First, one needs to have a theoretical rationale for 
the assumptions. This is often the most challenging. Take for example the use of 
Hurricane Katrina. If the hurricane altered labour market opportunities in general, it 
could increase the likelihood of rearrest. If the hurricane reconfigured opportunities 
for crime (that is, it produced more empty residences; Cohen and Felson, 1979), it 
could have a direct effect on rearrest. If the hurricane mobilised law enforcement as 
emergency personnel and hence increased surveillance, it could increase likelihood 
of rearrest. Unfortunately, there is no end to such ‘what if ’ questions and ultimately 
instruments have some invisible and potentially variable threshold as to their credibility. 
Second, when possible one should assess the validity of the exclusion restriction. In 
models that are just identified, when the number of instruments equals the number of 
endogenous variables, the assumption is not testable. Yet, if the model is overidentified, 
when there are more instruments than endogenous variables, one can use a 
Sargan–Hansen test that evaluates the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid with the test statistic distributed as a chi-square variable. Third, the instrumental 
variable must have a reasonably strong association with the endogenous variable 
and hence it is important to test for weak identification. While some argue that the 
F-statistics at the first stage should be greater than 10, Stock and Yogo (2005) offer a 
bias and size approach that takes into account the number of endogenous regressors, 
number of instruments, maximum tolerable bias and the estimation procedure.
Conclusions
This paper has been motivated by two general questions. First, given existing and 
influential arguments about how causality could/should work in the social sciences, 
how should life course researchers proceed? To answer this question, we have had to 
ask two other questions. Should we abandon interest in causal relationships among 
observable factors? Or do we want to base our understanding of the social world on 
information from artificial environments or contrived and highly problematic versions 
of the real world? To these latter questions, our answers are unequivocal nos. We lose 
a lot by abandoning inquiry into causal relationships and RCTs, in the lab or in the 
field, are not a panacea. Second, given this situation, how might we exploit changes in 
the socio-historic conditions of everyday life to draw better causal conclusions about 
social dynamics over the life course? In answering this question, we focus attention 
on the potential of ‘natural experiments’ and illuminate a small set of best practices.
Given this, our goals in this paper are modest. The goal of true, generalisable causal 
inference may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to attain, but problem of systematic 
bias in regression-type analyses is a simple reality. And, the literature provides three 
responses. First, some retreat from the traditional ideas of causality and instead offer 
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alternative perspectives (critical realism or data mining, for example). Second, some 
double down and advocate, often aggressively, for approaches that focus on model 
integrity and internal validity (see, for example, Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Third, 
and preferable for no other reasons than feasibility and transparency, is the use of 
‘natural’ experiments where naturally occurring phenomena create situations where 
reasonably comparable groups have different exposures to something of life course 
importance. As the latter approach offers something that has theoretical affinity with 
the guiding principles of life course research, we have described in some detail what 
natural experiments often look like, how life course data facilitates identification 
of ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups, and statistical approaches that facilitate credible 
identification of effects.
Natural experiments are also not a panacea and instead should be viewed as 
a complement to, not a replacement of, existing approaches. Some of the more 
informative research compares effects across models with different assumptions as a 
way of assessing the credibility of both simple models and more complex assumptions 
(such as Duke and Macmillan, 2016). At the same time, work such as Kirk (2009) 
is clearly an important addition in an area of study with a long and detailed history. 
What is important in such work, however, is that researchers are clear about their 
assumptions, their scope conditions and the limitations of their work. In the realm 
of natural experiments, researchers should be particularly careful to avoid reifying 
particular coefficients as better representations of reality. Estimates of D-I-D are 
highly dependent on what is being compared with what. RD estimates will vary, 
often widely, depending on bandwidth. IV estimates live or die based on the quality 
of the instrument. All of these are choices that a researcher makes and have no a 
priori answers.
In the end, there are three key takeaways. Life course researchers are clearly oriented 
to questions of causal influence. They organise their questions around cause and effect.
Descriptions of findings emphasise impact and change. Indeed, causality may be 
particularly ingrained in life course thinking given its dual pinions of lives shaped by 
socio-historical context and variability in how lives unfold over time. At the same 
time, most life course research does not do much to either enhance capacity for 
causal claims or mitigate the well-recognised sources of bias in the go-to methods 
of generalised linear models. Yet, this issue in life course research appears more 
ambivalence than apathy and the key question is what life course scholars could be 
doing that they currently are not doing to enhance the insights, influence and impacts 
of our work. Here, the exploitation of natural experiments seems a logical and natural 
avenue of inquiry. Cohorts are often ideal comparators. Life course transitions often 
sort people into ‘treatments’ and ‘controls’. Longitudinal studies give us leverage on 
changes over time in response to changing environmental exposures. Concerns with 
social structure have given us insight into the universe of causes and make us more 
comfortable with heterogeneity in outcomes that seriously undermine the credibility 
of those with narrow and dogmatic visions of human agency and who view causal 
inference as an issue of internal validity. With this toolkit, we are uniquely suited to 
capitalise on natural experiments and it is to our detriment if we do not.
Notes
 1  Corresponding author: Ross Macmillan, Department of Sociology, University of 
Limerick, Limerick, Ireland; ross.macmillan@ul.ie. An earlier version of this paper 
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was presented at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Society for Longitudinal and Life 
Course Research, Milan, Italy.
 2  Similarly, Montana switched mandatory years of schooling between six and eight 
five times between 1921 and 1936. Oklahoma did likewise between 1928 and 1936. 
Texas switched from zero to four, from four to seven, from seven to four, from four 
to seven, and from seven to eight over the study period. Florida was even more 
schizophrenic. It switched 11 mandatory years of schooling from zero to six then 
six to zero and then zero to seven in a mere five years between 1916 and 1921.
 3  One important diagnostic is McCrary’s (2008) density test that examines whether 
subjects are randomly distributed around the threshold. A second diagnostic is simple 
covariate comparison. A third diagnostic is a falsification test which examines whether an 
outcome that is highly unlikely to be influenced by the treatment is in fact influenced. 
Each approach essentially compares the distribution of cases around the threshold and 
assesses whether it appears random or not.
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